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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Appellee, s Case No. 920306-CA 
v. : 
WAYNE GENE NICHOLAS, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Wayne Gene Nicholas appeals his convictions 
for burglary and forcible sexual abuse, both second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 and 76-5-405 
(1990). This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should defendant be granted a new trial solely 
because of "gaps" in the trial transcript? This presents a 
question of law which, in turn, depends upon whether defendant 
has demonstrated prejudice stemming from the transcription 
errors. See State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah March 
11, 1992). 
2. Did the trial court err in sentencing defendant to 
serve two consecutive, one-to-fifteen year terms on his two 
second degree felony convictions? Utah's appellate courts review 
trial court sentencing decisions deferentially, reversing only 
for clear abuse of discretion. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 
192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
3. Does appellate defense counsel's noncompliance with 
the rule for filing an "Anders" brief preclude appellate review 
of various other issues advanced by defendant, but which counsel 
represents are unappealable? By its terms, this is a question of 
appellate policy that cannot be answered in the trial court; 
hence it is reviewed de. novo on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal will be 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was found guilty, upon jury trial, of 
burglary and forcible sexual abuse, both second degree felonies 
(R. 75-76). Following a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation by the 
Department of Corrections, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
two consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms at the Utah State 
Prison (R. 91-93). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Evidence Supporting the Guilty Verdicts 
At trial, defendant was identified by Peggy Williams 
and her daughter, Tonya, as the person who intruded into their 
St. George, Utah home at approximately 5:30 on a September 
morning, and awakened Tonya by sexually "fondling" her (T. 
2 
12/17/91 at 41, 72). Tonya recognized defendant because he had 
been in her home roughly two months earlier, in the company of 
one of Tonya's friends; soon after that meeting, defendant had 
made a return visit, speaking briefly to Tonya (id. at 38-40). 
During the September intrusion, Peggy Williams was 
awakened by Tonya's screams (T. 12/17/91 at 66). Tonya turned on 
the lights in the home, enabling Peggy to get a good look at the 
intruder (id. at 66-67). Further, the intruder complied in 
unhurried, seemingly casual fashion when Peggy demanded that he 
leave the premises (jLd. at 40-42, 68, 73). Thus at trial, Peggy 
Williams was also able to confidently identify defendant as the 
intruder (id. at 71-72). 
Sentencing Decision 
Following defendant's ninety-day diagnostic evaluation, 
the Department of Corrections filed a presentence report, which 
became part of the record on appeal (Record Index at 2). This 
sealed report has not been released by this Court to the State's 
appellate counsel; a motion for such release is pending as this 
brief is being prepared. 
However, the transcript of defendant's sentencing 
hearing reflects that defense counsel reviewed the presentence 
report and spoke to one of the individuals involved in preparing 
it (T. 4/15/92 at 2; full transcript at Appendix I of this 
brief). The presentence report apparently made no recommendation 
on concurrent versus consecutive sentencing (id. at 9). However, 
according to the prosecutor, and not contested by defense 
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counsel, defendant has a lengthy criminal record (id. at 7). It 
was reported that defendant had threatened Peggy or Tonya 
Williams while in jail following trial (id.). It further 
appeared that during his ninety-day evaluation, defendant had 
been placed in Mlock down" due to troublesome behavior (id.). 
The trial court also found defendant's behavior in the 
courtroom—laughing during a matter preceding his sentencing 
hearing—to be unacceptable (id. at 8-9). Subsequently, in its 
written judgment, sentence, and commitment, the trial court 
specifically found that defendant "is unable to control his 
impulses and constitutes a serious danger to the people of the 
state of Utah, and therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED that COUNT II [forcible sexual abuse] shall be served 
consecutively with COUNT I [burglary]" (R. 92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant cannot receive a new trial solely because of 
transcription errors or "gaps" in the original trial transcript. 
Such errors must be prejudicial in order to warrant a new trial. 
Defendant has made no showing of prejudice; further, he has 
failed to take measures, set forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedures, to cure the transcript problems. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing defendant. He received a statutorily permitted 
sentence, and the decision to sentence him consecutively for his 
two offenses was supported by information presented to the court. 
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Even if the trial court's sentencing decision was related in poit 
to defendant's courtroom conduct, it was proper. 
Defendant's appellate counsel has not met the 
requirements for filing an "Anders" brief with regard to the 
other issues identified on appeal. Counsel has not moved to 
withdraw from representing defendant; instead, he has advanced 
those issues that he identifies as bavlnq some meril. 
Accordingly, this Court need not review the other issues not 
analyzed by defense counsel. Further, it appears that those 
issues dip indeed roexiLless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRANSCRIPTION OF HIS TRIAL 
DO NOT, BY THEMSELVES, REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT 
RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant's trial was recorded on audiotape, rather 
than by a 1 * cuui t iepoit£ij Subsequently! the transcriber 
found that the trial audiotape contained inaudible sections and 
outright "gaps," caused by inoperable microphones and the failure 
at one point to have the recording equipment switched on 
(Certified Transcriber's Report, Exh. A to Br. of Appellant). 
Such transcription problems are unfortunate, and trial 
courts should make every effort to prevent them. However, by 
themselves, they do not compel a new trial. Instead, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has made clear, a new trial is required only when 
errors in transcribing the original trial are prejudicial State 
v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (March 11, 1992) (following 
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"clear weight of authority"). To be prejudicial, transcription 
errors or omissions must prevent review of substantive issues a 
party wishes to pursue on appeal, id. 
Defendant makes no showing that transcription problems 
in this case prevent appellate review of any substantive issues. 
In Exhibit "B" of his brief, he merely lists a number of gaps in 
the trial transcript, making no effort to show how they relate to 
his other issues on appeal. The State has reviewed those 
omissions at Appendix II of this brief: they appear to be minor, 
and unrelated to any substantive issue on appeal. Thus defendant 
has not met the Menzies "prejudice" requirement for a new trial. 
Accord Utah R. Crinu P. 30(a) (errors not affecting "substantial 
rights" "shall be disregarded"). 
Further, defendant has made no effort to cure the 
identified transcript omissions. Rules 11(f), -(g), and -(h), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allow parties to complete a 
deficient record on appeal, including transcript unavailability, 
with an agreed statement of the evidence, approved by the trial 
court. If the parties cannot agree on the evidence, the 
differences are settled by the trial court. Defendant has not 
attempted to do this, nor has he shown that this procedure could 
not adequately correct the transcript omissions. Accordingly, he 
cannot complain of the incomplete record now. Emia v. Havward, 
703 P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985) (failure to settle record 
under former Utah R. Civ. P. 75(m) bars complaint of incomplete 
record on appeal). 
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]f transcript pioblemb obst ui> evidence relevant to 
substantive issues on appeal# it is the appellant's duty to 
correct them. Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah 
App ) , cert. denied. lib 1 . M H 1 (» | til *ili 1989). Defendant has 
neither shown the relevance of , nor attempted to correct, the 
transcript problems in this case, and this failure works against 
him on appcM I 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
Defendant's complaint that he should not have been 
sentenced consecutively Jul the forcible sexual abuse and 
burglary convictions also fails Trial courts have broad 
discretion to impose statutorily-permitted sentences. State v, 
Russell, 791 P,2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990); State v. Rhodes, 818 
P.2d 1048/ 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Consecutive sentencing is also 
permitted in instances wherer as here, 1 he fame criminal ppisolc 
encompasses distinct criminal acts. State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 
843 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (affirming consecutive sentences for 
aggravated kidnapping rind sexual assault wit Inn same episode). 
Here the trial court was apprised of defendant's 
lengthy criminal history, his apparent danger to others, and of 
his poor impulse contiol, and 1 tu>k pa? in ulaj nr tn f t he* t 
considerations (R. 92). The court also expressed concern with 
the "terror" defendant's crimes had inflicted upon Peggy and 
Tonya Williams (1 4 ' 1 5/9> at H) Those die relevant sentencing 
considerations under Rhodes. 818 P.2d at 1051 (citing authority), 
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and clearly supported the court's decision, under the discretion 
provided by Utah Code Ann- § 76-3-401(1) (1990), to sentence 
defendant consecutively, rather than concurrently. 
Further, it was entirely permissible for the trial 
court to note defendant's courtroom behavior—which the court 
took as evidence of his poor impulse control—in meting out 
sentence. In State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978), the 
defendant tried to escape the courtroom during his sentencing 
hearing. The trial court then rescinded its decision, announced 
just before the escape attempt, to order a ninety-day presentence 
evaluation; instead, it imposed sentence. .Id. at 886. The 
supreme court squarely rejected the defendant's claim that the 
ninety-day evaluation should have not been rescinded: "Whether 
or not the trial judge changed his mind due to the conduct of the 
defendant or to other reasons is not our concern." JEd. at 887. 
Defendant's consecutive sentences here were statutorily 
permitted, and Gerrard demonstrates that he cannot assign his own 
disruptive courtroom behavior as a basis for setting the trial 
court's decision aside. There was no abuse of discretion by the 
trial court, and defendant's sentences should be affirmed. 
POINT THREE 
THE ADDITIONAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY 
DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL, BUT NOT 
ANALYZED IN "ANDERS" BRIEF FASHION, SHOULD 
NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT. 
While he has only briefed two points on appeal, defense 
counsel identifies four other issues: sufficiency of the 
evidence on each of the two guilty verdicts, a claimed "speedy 
8 
trial" violation,- arid ineffective assistance of counsel (Br. of 
Appellant at 2). Regarding these issues, counsel represents that 
he has "made a conscientious examination of the record, such as 
it i s, and i s unable to i n good faith argue any appealable 
issues" (id. at 5). He requests, however, that this Court 
independently examine the record for reversible error, citing 
Anders v.
 Caiifornjay 335 y # s # 738 f 87 S Ct 1396 (1967 ) . Thi s 
is unnecessary. 
Anders provides the means whereby counsel can withdraw 
the appeal is frivolous, in State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court adopted and spelled out the process 
of what has come to be cal led "Anders briefing," In essence,, the 
process requires appellate counsel to accompany his or her motion 
to withdraw with "a brief referring to anything in the record 
that might arguabl y suppoi: t the appeal," and to serve that brief 
on the defendant who, in turn, is allowed to respond. The 
appellate court then decides the withdrawal motion. Clayton, 639 
P 2d at 169 70. 
Here, while he has served his brief on defendant (Br. 
of Appellant at 6), appellate counsel has not moved to withdraw. 
Instead, he has briefed the two issues on appeal that, in his 
judgment, appear to have merit. As to the remaining issues, he 
has not followed the Anders-Clayton briefing requirements. 
Under these circumstances, the remaining issues 
identified in the Brief of Appellant should be disregarded 
9 
altogether. Appellate counsel's statement that those issues are 
"unappealable" merely makes explicit that which is implicit in 
any appellate brief: counsel has advanced the most promising 
issues, and discarded the hopeless ones. This is sound appellate 
practice. See Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336-37 (Utah 
App. 1991), quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. 
Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983) ("Experienced advocates since time out of 
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker 
arguments on appeal . . . " ) . 
Nor is this a death penalty case. Accordingly, this 
Court need not scour the record for unbriefed errors. Cf. State 
v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah March 11, 1992). Even 
in such a case, the Utah Supreme Court has endorsed the principle 
that "a reviewing court . . . is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Absent compliance with the 
Anders-Clayton procedures, then, defense counsel cannot expect 
this Court to independently seek out error. 
Briefly, it also appears that the unbriefed issues 
identified by defense counsel are, indeed, not worth pursuing. 
As set forth in this brief's statement of facts, there is 
adequate evidence supporting the guilty verdicts on burglary and 
forcible sexual abuse: defendant entered the Williams home 
without invitation or authorization, and committed a felony upon 
Tonya Williams. See Utah Code Ann. (1990) SS 76-6-202 (burglary 
10 
is unlawful entry with intent to commit a felony); 76-5-404 
(forcible sexual abuse is the taking of "indecent liberties" 
without consent). 
Defendant was tried for the offenses within three 
months of his arrest (R. 4, 76). It does not appear that he ever 
demanded a more speedy trial, even though he was informed on 
October 10 of his December 17 trial date (R. 22); much longer 
delays have been held acceptable. See State v. Trafnv, 799 P.2d 
704, 708 n. 16 (Utah 1990) (citing cases). 
Finally, at trial, defense counsel vigorously 
challenged the ability of Peggy and Tonya Williams to accurately 
identify defendant as the intruder in their home (e.g., T. 
12/17/91 at 48-52, 73-79). A comprehensive precautionary 
instruction about eyewitness identification testimony was given 
to the jury, and stressed in closing argument (R. 63-65, T. 
12/17/91 at 209-15). Thus trial counsel performed competently. 
Appellate counsel, in turn, has legitimately chosen to not pursue 
an ineffective counsel claim on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial transcription problems did not prejudice 
defendant, and therefore do not require a new trial. He was 
appropriately sentenced upon his convictions, which were secured 
by a trial that was fairly conducted. Accordingly, those 
convictions and sentences should now be affirmed. 
11 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ) day of October, 1992 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
DOUGLAS D. TERRY, attorney for defendant, 150 North 200 East, 
Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770, this "2») day of October, 
1992. 
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4 THE COURT: Call 911500095, State of Utah versus Wayne 
5 Gene Nicholas. The record will reflect that Mr. Nicholas is 
6 present, together with his counsel Mr. Terry. The State is 
7 represented by Mr. Langston. 
8 The Court has reviewed the recommendations of the 
9 ninety-day diagnostic unit. 
10 I'll hear you in mitigation, Mr. Terry. 
11 MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I — first of all, let me 
12 preface my remarks by saying that I'm aware that the State 
13 is going to ask that the Court follow the recommendation, 
14 and I believe is probably going to ask for consecutive 
15 sentences. I don't believe that — that that is warranted 
16 in this case, Your Honor. 
17 I spoke with Mr. Keith Smith this morning, who — 
18 it's his cover letter that accompanies the recommendation 
19 from the diagnostic unit. And — and I talked to Mr. Smith 
20 about the items that are contained in the diagnostic report, 
21 and I asked Mr. Smith two things. First of all, I asked him 
22 I if the recommendation would have been different absent 
23 the — the fight that Mr. Nicholas was engaged — or was 
24 involved in. And he told me yes, it probably would have 
25 been. All things being equal, had that not occurred, the 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 recommendation probably would have not been for a prison 
2 commitment. 
3 And I asked him also regarding Mr. Nicholas' 
4 admission and his willingness to take responsibility for 
5 what happened. And I don't know if the Court is aware, 
6 but — but after — just shortly after the recommendation — 
7 the diagnostic report was prepared, Mr. Nicholas, who had — 
8 who had indicated throughout the evaluation period that he 
9 took responsibility but could not specifically remember 
10 the — the event that took place that formed the basis for 
11 the charges that he was convicted of, he did go back into 
12 group and admitted — admitted his responsibility. Admitted 
13 his participation. And I asked Mr. Smith if that, you know, 
14 would — would make a difference, all other things being 
15 equal, and he indicated that yes, it would probably have 
16 made a difference. 
17 I talked to the victims. They're in the courtroom 
18 today. And I — I am going to make a proffer of what they 
19 told me. If the State wants to cross-examine them, I guess 
20 we could call them. I know they're very nervous about 
21 that. But both Tonya and her mother, Mrs. Williams, 
22 indicated to me ~ I told them what the recommendation was. 
23 I told them that — that my client had admitted and was 
24 taking full responsibility for what had happened; that he 
25 harbors no — no ill will whatsoever toward — toward them 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
4 
1 at this point; that he knows that it was — that it is his 
2 actions — it's his responsibility. And they told me that 
3 they do not necessarily feel like that prison commitment is 
4 either in their best interests or in the best interests of 
5 society or Mr. Nicholas' best interests. I talked to 
6 victims before, who are very bitter. And ~ and I'm not 
7 going to say whether or not the victim in this case has a 
8 right to be bitter, but I'm encouraged that she is not. I'm 
9 encouraged that that is for her best interests, that she 
10 does not harbor bitter feelings toward Mr. Nicholas. She 
11 would like to see Mr. Nicholas get the help that he needs. 
12 And her mother, Mrs. Williams, also indicated that to me. 
13 And I would submit to the Court, Your Honor, 
14 that ~ that I guess there's — there's two ways the Court 
15 can go. The Court can follow the recommendation. Send 
16 Mr. Nicholas to prison. He'll be out of prison after a 
17 period of time. And I'm not sure that — I'm not sure that 
18 he will be in any better position after that experience to 
19 insure that something like this or other type of criminal 
20 behavior does not happen again. 
21J The other option that I would submit to the Court 
22 is this. That he go into a — a treatment program — an 
23 intensive in-house treatment program. Perhaps one of the 
24 halfway houses. Ogden Correctional — or Community 
25 Correctiortal Center. Fremont. There are ~ there are 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 options available. That he be incarcerated here in the 
2 Washington County Jail for a period of time, and that he 
3 participate in ISAT — go through the ISAT program while 
4 here. 
5 And the reason that I believe that those options 
6 would serve all of the interests better than just a prison 
7 commitment is because I think that that is the best chance 
8 that we have of Mr. Nicholas being able to — to conform — 
9 learn how to conform his behavior that he has not been able 
10 to do up to this point and — and in so doing, not be a 
11 threat to himself or to society. 
12 If the victims were here today, and if they were 
13 pleading to the Court to throw this man in prison for — for 
14 as long as the Court possibly can, I probably wouldn't be 
15 asking for this, Your Honor. But they're not. That is not 
16 what -- that is not what they feel would be in their best 
17 interests or in the — Mr. Nicholas' best interests. And 
18 I — I just think that — that the Court has an obligation 
19 to the victims. The Court has an obligation to the people 
20 of the state of Utah to ~ to see that this does not happen 
21 again. And I strongly feel like an intensive program in — 
22 in conjunction with some incarceration — he's been — he's 
23 been incarcerated seven months. And I think that's had an 
24 impact on him. I didn't represent him before, but in 
25 talking to his prior counsel and others, I think that he's 
PAULG.McMULLIN 
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1 had an attitude adjustment. He definitely has. And I think 
2 that being incarcerated for the last seven months has had — 
3 has had something to do with that. But we need to figure 
4 out why he's doing the things — has done the things that 
5 he's done and teach him — help him teach himself. Help him 
6 to conform his behavior. And I would ask the Court to 
7 consider something less harsh than a prison commitment. 
8 Consider a treatment program in conjunction with -- with 
9 additional jail time, if necessary, but to allow him to get 
10 his problems under control so that they don't recur. I'm 
11 fearful that him going to prison will only exaggerate his 
12 problems, and he will come out a bigger threat to society 
13 than perhaps he is now. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
15 Mr. Nicholas, is there anything you want to say? 
16 MR. NICHOLAS: Yes, sir. I've had a lot of time to 
17 analyze myself. My life-style was pretty reckless. I think 
18 I deserve a chance in these programs. I know I have an 
19 attitude problem inside, and I don't think going to jail and 
20 putting me in that kind of atmosphere is going to help me 
21 out any. I'm sorry for the things that I've done, and I — 
22 I I'm ready for a program, you know, to — to prove myself. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Langston? 
24 MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, I think that the defendant's 
25 attitude has-been amply demonstrated even in court today by 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 his conduct over in the jury box. While the defendant has 
2 been here, since he has returned from the ninety-day 
3 diagnostic, he was placed in lock down because of 
4 assaultive-type behavior towards one of the jailers. 
5 The defendant has never demonstrated any kind of 
6 remorse. And it's kind of a deathbed repentance that he's 
7 talking about here today that "Well, now I'm going to accept 
8 responsibility for my actions," because that's the only 
9 thing he can do at this point. 
10 Now, the victims, true, are saying, "We think he 
11 needs help." And I — they have a very commendable attitude 
12 towards him. But there were threats made through third 
13 parties in the jail by the defendant towards the victim when 
14 he was incarcerated after the trial. 
15 The defendant is a danger to society. He has an 
16 extensive criminal record. The defendant was placed in lock 
17 down up in the state prison while he was there even for a 
18 ninety-day diagnostic, when he knew that he had to be on his 
19 best behavior. 
20 Now, if he says he wants counseling now, fine. He 
21 can get it through the prison. ISAT is available through 
22 the prison if he wants that. But in essence, what he's 
23 attempting to do is blackmail the Court here today by 
24 saying, wIf yon send me to prison, I'm going to be worse 
25 when I get out." And I don't think the Court should give in 
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1 to that type of blackmail. 
2 The people of the state of Utah have a right to be 
3 free from fear of people like the defendant. And we would 
4 demand — ask — we can't demand, but we would strongly ask 
5 the Court to sentence the defendant consecutive time. Send 
6 him up there and protect the people of the state. That's 
7 the only way we can be safe. We can't believe anything he 
8 says. And the only way to be safe from this threatening 
9 type of individual — a person who has been engaged in 
10 criminal activity such as he has —• is to put him away for 
11 as long as we possibly can. As long as the statute allows. 
12 His record justifies that; his behavior before and after 
13 I he's been convicted justifies that. And we would strongly 
14 urge the Court to follow that recommendation. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
16 Rebuttal to anything, Mr. Terry? 
17 MR. TERRY: No# Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Nicholas, you are fortunate in having 
19 been represented by an attorney who has taken the time to 
20 discuss with the victims their feelings. It speaks well of 
21 the Williams family and the victim, that they have recovered 
22 from the terror that you have inflicted upon their lives. 
23 That speaks well of them. Since this offense, your own 
24 conduct does not speak well of you, sir. 
25 The record should reflect that during the 
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1 sentencing phase for Mr. Cannistraci earlier on the calendar 
2 this morning, Mr. Nicholas, while seated in the jury box, 
3 determined, for some reason known only to himself, that it 
4 was appropriate to find it humorous to consider a ninety-day 
5 diagnostic ~ or a presentence report for Mr. Cannistraci. 
6 The fact that you were before this court looking 
7 at another 30 years and cannot control your impulses enough 
8 to even shut your mouth, Mr. Nicholas, does not serve you 
9 well, sir. 
10 The ninety-day diagnostic recommendation is for 
11 commitment. There is no recommendation as to whether or not 
12 that should be for concurrent or consecutive time. Your 
13 behavior, Mr. Nicholas, sets that recommendation, in my 
14 mind. 
15 It's the order of the Court on Count I, burglary, 
16 that you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a period 
17 of time not less than one year or more than 15 years. No 
18 fine is imposed. The restitution order — 
19 Counsel, do you have a restitution figure in front 
20 I of you? Has there been anything? 
21 MR. LANGSTON: I don't. Perhaps ~ I don't know if the 
22 probation had one in the presentence report or not. 
23 Your Honor, the victims have informed me that they 
24 haven't sought out any counseling to help them deal with 
25 this; so, there are no costs associated with that. 
PAULG.MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
I 10 
1 THE COURT: All right. No restitution order made. 
2 MR. TERRY: Your Honor, can I interrupt the Court for 
3 just a moment? 
4 THE COURT: Nof Counsel. I think that's the end of it. 
5 MR. NICHOLAS: Sir, may I — I wasn't laughing at 
6 Mr. Cannistraci. My nieces and nephews — I haven't seen 
7 them for a long timef and they were waving at me. And I 
8 can't help if they made me laugh. I was — Mr. Cannistraci 
9 is in my cell with me, and I have nothing against him. And 
10 I didn't find anything funny about this thing. I'm very 
11 sorry. It's just that I haven't seen my nieces and nephews, 
12 and I love them a lot, and they made me laugh. I'm sorry. 
13 THE COURT: Well, you should be, sir. 
14 As to Count II, it's the sentence of the Court 
15 that you serve not less than one nor more than 15 years in 
16 the Utah State Prison. No fine is imposed. No order of 
17 restitution made; none sought by the State. 
18 It is the order of the Court that those sentences 
19 be — be served consecutively, one after the other. 
20 If you are truly honest about your desire to 
21 change your life — change the reckless nature of your 
22 behavior — then you will be given the opportunity to do so 
23 by the Department of Corrections. If you keep your nose 
24 clean, they'll put you into a program inside the institution 
25 and then work you into Fremont or Bonneville. Whatever 
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1 halfway house facility is available. Take you there. But 
2 the ball is in your court. You decide. You show by your 
3 own behavior that you can work with the people up there. 
4 That's the order of the Court. Go back and have a 
5 seat. 
6 (Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
7 matter were concluded.) 
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APPENDIX II 
State's Review of Transcript Omissions 
State's Review of "Inaudible" Transcript 
Problems Identified by Defendant, at Exhibit "B" 
of his Brief of Appellant 
(page references are to trial transcript T. 12/17/91) 
No. Page Line Context 
1-12 (Exh. B, appellant's brief) Jury selection and 
prosecutor's opening 
statement. 
13 37 14 Problem corrected when witness 
directed to answer out loud. 
14 43 4 Describing the Williams home, 
intruder's likely mode of 
entry. 
Describing Williams home. 
Reviewing witness's prior 
statement to police. 
Excusing jury for discussion 
outside its presence. 
Evidentiary ruling by court. 
Noting a defense objection. 
Witness explaining an exhibit. 
Witness explaining an exhibit. 
Defense opening statement. 
Excusing a witness. 
Defendant describing his 
living and job situation. 
26 156 18 Defendant describing his 
tattoo. 
27 157 6 Defendant describing prior 
acquaintance with Tonya 
Williams. 
28 165 14 Defendant describing a trip to 
Mesquite ("car or truck?"). 
29 171 11 Court comment after announcing 
recess. 
30 172 25 Tonya Williams describing 
intruder's position on her 
bed. 
31 180 21 Peggy Williams reviewing her 
need to wear glasses. 
32 183 8 Peggy Williams re-describing 
intruder's exit from home. 
33 187 15 Court reviewing record of 
another proceeding. 
34 195 6 Reviewing jury instructions 
with counsel. 
35 218 22 Defense closing argument. 
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